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Abstract 
 
The Court of Appeal in the case of R v Mika failed to engage with section 27 of the Sentencing Act 2002 in 
dismissing Mr Mika’s appeal against his sentence. In both the High Court and Court of Appeal the focus was 
on Mr Mika’s argument for a discount of 10 per cent to be applied to his sentence to reflect his Māori heritage 
and associated social disadvantages. Section 27 of the Sentencing Act would allow a court to take into account 
cultural information regarding Maori offenders’ backgrounds and the systemic disadvantages stemming from 
this. In dismissing Mika’s appeal, the Court erred in not considering the clear signals from Parliament that 
the judiciary were to take into account Maori offenders’ backgrounds at the sentencing stage through s 27 in 
an effort to fit appropriate sentences to Maori offenders. Recent developments in Canada have seen the 
Canadian judiciary recognise their role in the over-representation of Aboriginal people in the Canadian prison 
population. The New Zealand judiciary can take lessons from the willingness of the Canadian judiciary to 
take cultural information into account at sentencing. 
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I Introduction 
 
The Court of Appeal in Mika v R1 erred in its decision to dismiss Fabian Mika’s appeal 
against his sentence by failing to acknowledge the appropriate statutory provisions and the 
New Zealand Parliament’s clear signals that the judiciary was expected to deal with Māori 
over-representation in the New Zealand prison population.  
 
Parliament acknowledged Māori over-representation within the New Zealand justice 
system, with the introduction of the Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 16, the precursor to the 
Sentencing Act 2002, s 27. The provision was originally enacted as a response to the over-
representation of Māori in the NZ prison population. Section 27 allows judges to gain 
insight into the cultural backgrounds of all offenders generally, and can be used to focus 
on Māori offenders specifically. Section 27(5) allows the judiciary to suggest to the 
offender that it may be of assistance to the court to hear a person speak on the matters in s 
27(1). This paper focuses on the exercise of this discretion. Currently, as typified by R v 
Mika, the provision does not serve its intended purpose.  
 
The High Court2 and Court of Appeal, dismissed Mika’s argument for a 10 per cent 
sentencing discount to reflect his Māori heritage and associated disadvantages. The Judges 
acknowledged s 27, but failed to apply it. The onus is on the offender to request a person 
speak, but the judge has discretion to suggest to the offender it may be of assistance to hear 
a person speak.3 The Court failed to consider all relevant matters in declining to use its 
discretion under s 27(5). Counsel for Mika, Mr Rapley, failed to argue the provision. 
Parliament had an expectation when enacting s 27 that the Court would address over-
representation, and inquire after all the appropriate information before deciding a sentence. 
By refusing to exercise the discretion the court did not ensure all relevant information was 
before it, in order to make the best decision. Further, these Parliamentary signals were 
  
1 Mika v R [2013] NZCA 648. 
2 R v Mika [2013] NZHC 2357. 
3 Sentencing Act 2002, s 27(5). 
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interpreted in Wells v Police4, which the Court neglected to consider. The Court of Appeal 
was careful to avoid using ethnicity as a mitigating factor in deciding Mika’s sentence, 
nevertheless it was the Court’s duty to use its discretion to inquire after information under 
s 27(5). A sentence discount was considered inappropriate to address over-representation, 
yet the Court failed to apply fully the one measure specifically enacted for that purpose. 
 
The Court of Appeal was too quick to declare consideration of Mika’s cultural background 
unworkable within the current legislative framework. This is out of step with the Canadian 
Supreme Court, in recent years, recognising the issue of over-representation of its 
Aboriginal5 people in the Canadian prison population. The similar Canadian provision was 
accepted as a mandatory sentencing step for Aboriginal offenders, whereas in New Zealand 
s 27 provides a judicial discretion. Mika highlights the judiciary’s failure to exercise their 
s 27(5) discretion to prevent injustices. A balance must be struck between seeking 
information and the efficacious delivery of justice, therefore s 27 should be applied where 
Māori offenders are facing serious charges, or the court is deciding between sentences; for 
example a custodial sentence of certain length versus another length or a custodial and non-
custodial sentence. This would give effect to Parliament’s intent for the provision to 
provide further information for judges sentencing Māori offenders as a method of 
remedying over-representation. Parliament’s signals should be acted upon; s 27 should 
apply regardless of the fact that the offender fails to encourage sympathy for their situation 
as evidenced by Mika. 
 
 
II R v Mika 
A The Dismissal by the Court of Appeal  
 
  
4 Wells v Police [1987] 2 NZLR 560 (HC). 
5 When referring to Aboriginal peoples of Canada, the designation comprises of the First Nations, Inuit and 
Métis peoples. 
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On 12 December 2013 the New Zealand Court of Appeal, comprising of Harrison, Simon 
France and Dobson JJ, dismissed Fabian Mika’s appeal against his sentence of six years 
and nine months imprisonment. Mika pleaded guilty in the High Court to charges of 
manslaughter6, failing to comply with a prohibition as an unlicensed driver7, failing to stop 
or ascertain injury or death after a crash8 and failing to stop when followed by red and blue 
flashing lights.9 Mika appealed against his sentence on the ground that it was manifestly 
excessive because the Judge failed to adopt a 10 per cent sentencing discount to reflect his 
Māori heritage and the associated social disadvantages.10 The judgment focused on the 
discount, perhaps due to the application of discounts of up to 25 per cent for guilty pleas.11 
Section 27 was raised in both the High Court and the Court of Appeal judgments, yet the 
failure to apply the section indicates the judiciary did not consider the precedent and 
Parliament’s intent. The Court of Appeal referred to s 27 briefly: 
 
[14] Finally, we note, as did David Gendall J in the High Court, that s 27 of the 
Sentencing Act entitles an offender to request the Court before sentencing to hear any 
person or persons called to speak on, among other things, the offender’s whānau and 
cultural background. It was open to Mr Rapley to take this step, but he did not do so. 
 
Mika’s appeal for a 10 per cent discount was based on a number of interrelated claims 
regarding Māori heritage and its bearing on sentencing in New Zealand.12 Counsel for Mika 
submitted that a failure occurred in not taking into account the systemic and background 
factors that may contribute to offending by Māori;13 the Māori background of an offender 
may point to the need for alternative sanctions;14 generally the court did not factor into the 
sentencing process the tendency of Māori offenders receiving longer jail terms than their 
  
6 Crimes Act 1961, ss 160(2)(a), 171 and 177. 
7 Land Transport Act 1998, s 52(1)(c). 
8 Land Transport Act 1998, s 36(1)(c). 
9 Land Transport Act 1998, s 52(1)(c). 
10 Mika v R, above n 1, at [2]. 
11 R v Mika, above n 2, at [54]. 
12 At [6]. 
13 At [6]. 
14 At [6]. 
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non-Māori counterparts.15 These considerations were supported by Canadian and 
Australian judgments where offenders’ indigenous backgrounds were considered in 
sentencing, in an effort to reduce numbers in prison.16 It was open to the Court of Appeal 
to address these issues at sentencing within New Zealand’s legislative context.  
 
Mika’s appeal was dismissed for a number of reasons. The Court of Appeal sat as a 
Divisional Court17 and declared it was not the place to decide on sentencing principles and 
policy without the proper evidential foundation.18 The Court of Appeal declined to read 
into the Sentencing Act any special sentencing conditions for Māori offenders. The Act 
was declared a “comprehensive code” whereby the sentencing provisions Parliament 
requires courts to follow are prescribed without reference to ‘ethnicity’.19 Specifically s 8, 
outlining the principles of sentencing, and s 9, the aggravating and mitigating factors, omit 
the word ‘ethnicity’, though it was acknowledged s 9 is not an exhaustive list.20 The Court 
resolved, if ethnicity mandated an “absolute requirement” that a court apply a fixed 
discount, this could only be sanctioned by Parliament and would have been made plain in 
the Sentencing Act or in another statute.21 Therefore, it was unlikely Parliament intended 
the Sentencing Act apply a blanket discount to all Māori offenders’ sentences, regardless 
of offender, offence and culpability factors. The Court of Appeal was reluctant to draw on 
the Canadian and Australian authorities in making this decision regarding indigenous 
sentencing. Without identifying the differences in the statutory contexts, the Court 
concluded the authorities were of “no assistance”.22 Mika’s case did not invoke great 
sympathy from the judiciary or the general public.23 It was dismissed for the 
  
15 At [6]. 
16 At [6]. 
17 Judicature Act 1908, s 58. 
18 At [7]. 
19 At [8]. 
20 At [8]. 
21 At [9]. 
22 At [13]. 
23 David Clarkson “Mob member wants short sentence for being Māori” (20 November 2013) Stuff 
<http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/crime/9422033/Mob-member-wants-short-sentence-for-being-Maori>. 
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aforementioned reasons without looking to the New Zealand jurisprudence and discretion 
afforded to the judiciary under s 27(5). 
 
A significant aspect of the decision was the Court of Appeal’s acknowledgment of the over-
representation of Māori in the New Zealand prison population. The leading judgment of 
the appellate court declared judges “are acutely conscious of that factor and its reflection 
of the economic, social and cultural disadvantages suffered by many Māori. We accept that 
those circumstances frequently contribute to offending.”24 However, the Court dismissed 
the argument that these disadvantages entitled Māori to a blanket discount as “it does not 
logically follow that a person is more likely to be at a disadvantage and to offend simply 
by virtue of his or her Māori heritage.”25 The Court went as far as to state the proposition 
was conceivably offensive, although presumably not to Māori offenders at the sentencing 
stage. The Court recognised the disproportionate imprisonment of Māori and s 27 brought 
the issue within their purview, yet the Court remained silent on the issue. The 
acknowledgement of Māori over-representation was the only statement of great value in 
the judgment. 
 
 
III The Court Erred in not Adequately Taking into Account Section 27 
A Over-representation of Māori in the New Zealand Criminal Justice System 
 
Within the New Zealand criminal justice system generally and the prison population 
specifically, Māori are over-represented in comparison to the general population. 
According to the Ministry of Justice as at 31 March 2013, Māori represented 50 per cent 
of the prison population, while making up only 14 per cent of the general population.26 
  
24 At [12]. 
25 At [12]. 
26 Ministry of Justice United Nations convention against torture: New Zealand draft periodic report 6 
(2013) at [158]. 
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Khylee Quince noted that, the over-representation exists throughout the criminal justice 
system:27  
 
As well as disparities at the front end in the over-policing, charging and conviction of 
Māori, there are differences in the outcomes imposed on Māori in the criminal justice 
system. Seven times as many Māori as non-Māori are given a custodial sentence upon 
conviction. Māori are far less likely to be granted leave for home detention, or to receive 
a fiscal penalty. 
 
Quince’s observations are borne out by recent New Zealand Ministry of Justice statistics 
indicating that of the adults convicted in 2012/13, 41 per cent were European, 38 per cent 
were Māori and 10 per cent Pacific peoples.28 These statistics indicate a problem exists, 
with Māori significantly over-represented.  
 
In 2011, Kim Workman addressed the issue of Māori over-representation within the 
criminal justice system and examined whether the issue was attributable to structural 
discrimination.29 Evidence, including Māori being four to five times more likely to be 
apprehended, prosecuted and convicted than non-Māori, led Workman to comment:30 
 
… we know what is happening, there seems to be a collective reluctance on the part of 
the government and its agencies to delve further into this information, and try to 
understand why this is happening. 
 
  
27 Khylee Quince “Māori and the Criminal Justice System in New Zealand” in Warren Brookbanks and 
Julia Tolmie (eds) Criminal Justice in New Zealand (LexisNexis NZ, Wellington, 2007) 333 at 334. 
28 Ministry of Justice Trends in Conviction and Sentencing – Court statistics for adults (aged 17 and over) 
for year ended June 2013 (2013) at 2. 
29 Kim Workman “Māori Over-representation in the Criminal Justice System – Does Structural 
Discrimination Have Anything to Do with It?” (8 November 2011) Rethinking Crime and Punishment 
<http://www.rethinking.org.nz/assets/Newsletter_PDF/Issue_105/01_Structural_Discrimination_in_the_CJ
S.pdf> at 2. 
30 Workman, above n 29, at 14. 
7 
 
The current over-representation trend cannot continue, a fundamental shift in attitude is 
necessary.31  
 
The 2007 Department of Corrections report ‘Over-representation of Māori in the Criminal 
Justice System’ identifies that New Zealand’s criminal justice system “deliberately seeks 
to be ‘blind’ to much of the accused person’s personal and social circumstances.”32 This is 
true of New Zealand’s criminal law which focuses on individual liability. The report finds 
there may be strength in a less individualised response to offending due to the multifaceted 
nature of the issues involved.33 Allowing more cultural based information to be placed 
before the courts transforms the concept of individualised justice and introduces the notion 
of collective justice to the criminal justice system. Account should perhaps be taken of 
matters that affect the collective Māori community. The factors affecting a Māori offender 
may extend beyond the individual and their ethnicity, rather encompassing their cultural 
background and history, including social and economic disadvantages.34 Indeed, the 
report’s authors concluded: “Māori over-representation is not a ‘Māori’ problem at all.”35 
 
Many minority ethnic groups present in New Zealand may be over-represented in criminal 
justice statistics.36 Therefore, a practical approach targeting Māori offenders may be 
viewed as preferentialism. However, the sheer numbers of Māori in New Zealand prisons 
creates urgency. With Māori comprising 14 per cent of New Zealand society, yet 
representing half of the prison population, the number of incarcerated Māori leaves a void 
  
31 Workman, above n 29, at 24. 
32 Department of Corrections Over-representation of Māori in the criminal justice system: An exploratory 
report (September 2007) at 38. 
33 At 38. 
34 Department of Corrections Over-representation of Māori in the criminal justice system: An exploratory 
report, above n 32, at 38. 
35 At 38. 
36 Bronwyn Morrison Identifying and Responding to Bias in the Criminal Justice System: A Review of 
International and New Zealand Research (Ministry of Justice, November 2009) at 18. 
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in the offenders’ families and communities.37 Valmaine Toki declared the issue of 
indigenous people over-represented in prison populations to be endemic.38  
 
The Court of Appeal accepted in Mika the over-representation of Māori was an issue in 
New Zealand, but declined to make a decision on how to approach this.39 Both the High 
Court and the Court of Appeal focused on the appropriateness of setting a discount, but 
ignored that Mika had not requested cultural information be brought before the court under 
s 27. The Court had the opportunity to call for cultural information under s 27(5) and failed 
to do so. Max Harris was disappointed by the Court’s failure to take action to address over-
representation:40 
 
The problem is regarded by many as a national disgrace, which requires urgent action 
by politicians – and recognition of this fact by the Court might have fortified its 
conclusions based on the wording of the Sentencing Act. 
 
B Sentencing Act 2002 
 
The Sentencing Act provides judges with mechanisms through which the cultural 
background of offenders and the systemic disadvantages affecting Māori may be 
considered. The over-representation of Māori was an important consideration in the 
drafting of the Sentencing Act.41 Sections 8, 26 and 27 provide for cultural information to 
be considered at sentencing. Principle 8(i) provides a foundation for taking into account 
cultural information:42 
  
37 Department of Corrections Over-representation of Māori in the criminal justice system: An exploratory 
report, above n 32, at 39. 
38 Valmaine Toki “Domestic Violence and Women: Can a Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach Assist?” 
(2009) 78 Rev. Jur. U.P.R. 61 at 62. 
39 At [12]. 
40 Max Harris “Criminal law, sentencing and ethnicity – sensible [or] superficial?” (2014) February Māori 
LR 20 at 24. 
41 (12 June 1985) 463 NZPD 4759. 
42 For the full section 8 see appendix A.1. 
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8 In sentencing or otherwise dealing with an offender the court— 
(i) must take into account the offender's personal, family, whānau, community, 
and cultural background in imposing a sentence or other means of dealing with the 
offender with a partly or wholly rehabilitative purpose 
 
It is mandatory for the court to consider this principle in sentencing an offender. Section 8 
principles provide a sentencing base and allow for the use of other mechanisms by which 
cultural factors may play a role. Section 25 allows the court to adjourn proceedings to allow 
for inquiries into a suitable punishment for the offender.43 
 
Section 26 pre-sentence reports, include information regarding the personal, family, 
whānau, community, and cultural background, and social circumstances of the offender.44 
These provisions provide the mechanisms by which cultural information can be placed 
before the court. Max Harris stated, “The Court might have concluded upon analysing these 
provisions that an ethnicity-based discount was entirely coherent and consistent with the 
purpose and spirit of the Sentencing Act.”45 The Court of Appeal did not take sufficient 
account of the foundation provisions that allow for cultural information to be called on by 
a court under s 27(5). 
 
1 Section 27 
Section 27 of the Sentencing Act may prove itself vital for addressing the over-
representation of Māori in New Zealand prisons. The section provides:46 
 
27 Offender may request court to hear person on personal, family, whānau, community, 
and cultural background of offender 
  
43 For the full section 25 see appendix A.2. 
44 Sentencing Act 2002, s 26(2)(a). For the full section 26 see appendix A.3. 
45 Harris, above n 40, 24. 
46 For section 27 see appendix A.4. 
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(1) If an offender appears before a court for sentencing, the offender may request the court 
to hear any person or persons called by the offender to speak on— 
(a) the personal, family, whānau, community, and cultural background of the 
offender: 
(b) the way in which that background may have related to the commission of the 
offence: 
(c) any processes that have been tried to resolve, or that are available to resolve, 
issues relating to the offence, involving the offender and his or her family, 
whānau, or community and the victim or victims of the offence: 
(d) how support from the family, whānau, or community may be available to help 
prevent further offending by the offender: 
(e) how the offender's background, or family, whānau, or community support 
may be relevant in respect of possible sentences. 
(2) The court must hear a person or persons called by the offender under this section on 
any of the matters specified in subsection (1) unless the court is satisfied that there is 
some special reason that makes this unnecessary or inappropriate. 
(3) If the court declines to hear a person called by the offender under this section, the 
court must give reasons for doing so. 
(4) Without limiting any other powers of a court to adjourn, the court may adjourn the 
proceedings to enable arrangements to be made to hear a person or persons under this 
section. 
(5) If an offender does not make a request under this section, the court may suggest to the 
offender that it may be of assistance to the court to hear a person or persons called by 
the offender on any of the matters specified in subsection (1). 
 
Section 27 is a presumptive entitlement, allowing an offender to request the court hear a 
person speak on their personal, family, whānau, community and cultural background. 
Importantly, these cultural factors may relate to the commission of the offence or possible 
sentences. Section 27(5) is an important provision allowing the court to inquire after 
information on the offender where they consider it useful. There is no requirement for the 
person called on to speak on the matters in s 27(1) to give evidence under oath, they may 
speak outside the witness box and without cross-examination; this encourages informal 
11 
 
communication of evidence.47 The explicit recognition that an offender’s cultural 
background may contribute to offending on an individual basis, is quite exceptional.48 
Effectively, s 27 provides a foundation for the judiciary, to take into account matters 
specific to Māori offenders, such as offenders’ backgrounds and historic disadvantage, at 
sentencing. 
 
2 Section 27 enacted with Māori in mind 
 
Section 27 does not single out Māori as the intended recipients of the presumptive 
entitlement. Nevertheless, the section may have been implemented to address the over-
representation of Māori offenders specifically, notwithstanding that the section is worded 
broadly to encompass all ethnic groups. As will be discussed further below, the passage of 
s 27’s predecessor, s 16 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985, is instructive. The Minister of 
Justice at the time of the Criminal Justice Bill’s second reading, the Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey 
Palmer, revealed the purpose of s 16 was to “secure the co-operation of ethnic minorities 
that at present experience high rates of imprisonment in seeking ways of finding 
alternatives to imprisonment.”49 The provision was framed generally to avoid the inevitable 
arguments of preferentialism of Māori over other racial groups.50 Māori being the most 
over-represented group in criminal justice statistics would have been influential in drafting 
the Bill. To remedy the over-representation of Māori, the New Zealand judiciary would 
need to make a conscious effort to sentence Māori with regard to the available provisions 
of the Sentencing Act, looking to the systemic disadvantages and societal issues plaguing 
the offender.  
 
  
47 Bruce Robertson (ed) Adams on Criminal Law – Sentencing (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at 
[SA27.01]. 
48 Sam Jeffs “Māori Overrepresentation and the Sentencing Act: The Role of Cultural Background” (19 
September 2013) New Zealand Human Rights Blog <http://nzhumanrightsblog.com/policy/maori-
overrepresentation-and-the-sentencing-act-the-role-of-cultural-background/#more-517>. 
49 (23 July 1985) 464 NZPD 5834. 
50 (23 July 1985) 464 NZPD 5834. 
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The wording of s 27 strongly indicates the provision should be read as applying especially 
to Māori offenders. At numerous points throughout the Sentencing Act, ‘whānau’ is a 
factor often in consideration when determining a sentence. A dictionary of Māori legal 
terms defines whānau as:51  
 
Kin linked by a living or recent ancestor. The meaning now extends to family, a multi-
generation group consisting of parents, children (including adopted children) and their 
spouses, and grandchildren. In modern usage it includes various special interest groups 
whose members function as a kin. 
 
Section 27 sets out ‘whānau’ as one of the matters a person may speak on under s 27(1). 
The provision makes no mention of another cultural kin based collective entity. The 
individual nature of New Zealand’s criminal law liability means that the greater the 
offending and the higher the harm caused by the offending, the less the court can take into 
account the individual circumstances of the offender. However, the term ‘whānau’ could 
be interpreted in such a way as to require collective justice to be taken into account at 
sentencing.  
 
The judiciary are empowered to acknowledge Māori as a group to whom the application of 
s 27 is necessary. The specific mention of ‘whānau’ may entitle the Court to read in the 
importance of s 27 when sentencing Māori offenders. In cases where the offenders do not 
call on the provision, the court should step in under s 27(5), unless specifically waived by 
the offender. The Court of Appeal in Mika were concerned that a blanket discount of 10 
per cent would constitute judicial overreach. This paper does not advocate a discount for 
Māori offenders. However, the judiciary are able to encourage the use of s 27 for Māori 
offenders appearing for sentencing, this would not amount to judicial overreach as space 
exists in the legislation for this interpretation. Further, this is in line with Parliament’s 
original intention for the provision. The specific mention of whānau and the purpose of the 
  
51 Māmari Stephens and Mary Boyce (eds) He Papakupu Reo Ture: A Dictionary of Māori Legal Terms 
(LexisNexis, Wellington, 2013) at 121. 
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legislation to deal with Māori over-representation point to the conclusion that cultural 
considerations at sentencing are necessary for Māori offenders especially. 
 
The Ministry of Justice introduced s 16 with the aim of reducing imprisonment by engaging 
with communities, encouraging community based sentences.52 The legislators clearly 
envisaged a sentencing practice where the whanau and wider community were encouraged 
to participate in an attempt to understand the options available when sentencing a Māori 
offender. Involving different cultures would enable communities to find alternatives to 
imprisonment for members of their communities who offend. 
 
The text of both provisions leads me to conclude s 27 is an expansion of s 16; the 
introduction of the word ‘whānau’, the excision of ‘ethnic background’ and the 
introduction of the relevancy of cultural background to possible sentences. 
 
C Parliamentary Signals 
 
The current provision has been greatly expanded from its predecessor, s 16 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1985.53 Section 27 reflects its predecessor, in addition it allows a person to be 
called upon to speak on a broader range of matters. Paragraphs (c) and (e) were entirely 
new in the Sentencing Act, expanding the provision’s scope to enable the court to take into 
account processes that may have been taken, or could be taken, to resolve the issues relating 
to the offence as well as the relevance of the offenders’ background factors in relation to 
possible sentences. Section 27’s expansion may reflect a desire for more situations under 
which the offender’s cultural background may play a part in sentencing. Important insight 
into s 27 is gained from its predecessor. 
 
  
52 Alison Chetwin, Tony Waldegrave, Kiri Simonsen with Strategic Training and Development Services & 
The Family Centre Social Policy Research Unit Speaking about cultural background at sentencing: Section 
16 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 (Ministry of Justice, November 2000) at 138. 
53 For the full provision see appendix B.1. 
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Section 16 was introduced to the Criminal Justice Bill in 1985, after the Justice Department 
report addressing “Sentencing trends in District Courts 1979-1983 (Males)” declared a 
disparity between Māori and non-Māori imprisonment rates even when a comparison was 
drawn between persons of similar socio-economic status.54 The report emphasised the 
encouragement of alternatives to imprisonment for Māori offenders as a solution.55 The 
Justice Department went on to propose:56 
 
…Māori offenders appearing before a Court for sentence should be entitled to have a 
person who is familiar with the case advise the Court on the offender's family 
circumstances and cultural background and on such other matters as the Court considers 
relevant. Such a right would be in addition to the right to legal representation. A further 
provision should be added indicating that the Courts have power to allow any offender 
to call a person to advise the Court on the offender's family circumstances and cultural 
background and any other matter considered relevant to the Court. This would help to 
counter any argument that the proposed change discriminates unduly in favour of Māori 
offenders in comparison with offenders from other racial groups. In our view these new 
provisions would greatly assist to secure the co-operation of Māori people seeking ways 
to find alternatives to imprisonment. 
 
Following the Justice Department submission, the Bill included the proposed entitlement 
to have a person speak on the offender’s family circumstances and cultural background in 
what would be s 16.57 Evidently, the Statutes Revision Committee reporting on the 
Criminal Justice Bill, agreed that Māori rates of imprisonment were concerning. Parliament 
fully intended to deal with over-representation by means of the provision, by considering 
the backgrounds of Māori offenders at sentencing. 
 
Dr Cullen, Chairperson for the Statutes Revision Committee, voiced the importance of the 
addition to the Bill, emphasising the importance of sentences meeting the needs of Māori 
  
54 Department of Justice Criminal Justice Bill No.2 (22 April 1985) at 2. 
55 At 3. 
56 At 2-3. 
57 Wells v Police, above n 4, at 569. 
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offenders.58 Young Māori offenders were recognised as forming a disproportionately large 
section of the prison population, “to the shame of us all.”59 Parliament was supportive, 
recognising the need for a specific sentencing provision to address the disproportionate 
numbers of Māori in prison. A crucial step in reducing the numbers in prison involved the 
judiciary undertaking their role in acknowledging matters specific to Māori offenders, 
including backgrounds and historic disadvantage. 
 
In the legislative period between the passage of the Criminal Justice Act and the passage 
of the Sentencing Act there appears to be no change in Parliament’s intent that the Courts 
have the ability to receive information to enable them to deal with Māori over-
representation. In fact, s 27 greatly expanded upon the previous provision, indicating the 
continued importance of dealing with Māori over-representation. There is no reason to 
suspect the principles underpinning the previous amendment have changed. 
 
D Wells v Police 
 
Wells v Police sheds valuable light on the purpose of s 16. Wells was an appeal to the High 
Court on the grounds that the sentencing Judge had misinterpreted s 16 of the Criminal 
Justice Act.60 Smellie J undertook an analysis of the purpose of s 16 and determined its 
enactment was largely due to the disproportionate rate of imprisonment of Māori and the 
limited alternatives to imprisonment for Māori offenders.61 Smellie J acknowledged:62 
 
There is, today, a growing (and some would say long overdue) recognition that the Court 
system in this country based as it is on the Anglo-Saxon traditions of the common law 
is not always flexible enough to ensure fair and appropriate treatment for all New 
Zealanders.  
  
58 (12 June 1985) 463 NZPD 4759. 
59 (12 June 1985) 463 NZPD 4759. 
60 At 566. 
61 At 570. 
62 At 570. 
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Wells’ focus on the legislative purpose for enacting s 16 provides a clear picture of the 
provision and strong authority for later cases. Parliament envisioned the court would 
receive information to recognise Māori cultural patterns and alternative programmes for 
discipline and reformation of Māori offenders. 
 
Later cases have continued to refer to the underlying principles of s 16 articulated in Wells. 
On appeal, Nishikata v Police63 raises the issue of the District Court’s failure to consider 
cultural factors under s 16. Nishikata refers to Wells’ discussion of Parliament’s intent for 
a court to receive information on cultural patterns and alternatives to imprisonment for 
Māori.64 Similarly, the Judge notes s 16’s general application to avoid suggestion of 
preferential treatment.65 This decision affirmed Wells’ interpretation of Parliament’s intent.  
 
Wells’ analysis of Parliament’s intent is no longer referred to by courts following the 
introduction of s 27. However, Wells remains highly persuasive as Parliament has 
continued in the same direction set by the previous provision. Wells’ interpretation of 
Parliamentary signals are not considered by either the Court of Appeal or Mika’s counsel. 
No strong signal from Parliament exists to indicate the courts are intended to deviate from 
the Wells interpretation.  
 
The Parliamentary material on s 16 and the Wells decision, demonstrate s 27 was originally 
introduced by Parliament as part of an ongoing, and strengthened, response to the over-
representation of Māori in New Zealand’s prison population. Parliament considered it 
important to gather information concerning Māori offender’s backgrounds and sentencing 
options in an attempt to curb the number of Māori in prison. Section 27 was enacted to 
remedy the statistical imbalance to some extent. The Courts have underutilised this 
provision, undermining this purpose. 
 
  
63 Nishikata v Police HC Wellington AP126/99, 22 July 1999. 
64 At 6. 
65 At 7. 
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IV Section 27(5) Discretion Available to the Judiciary 
A The Court’s Failure to Exercise this Discretion 
 
R v Mika was a step in the wrong direction for the New Zealand judiciary dealing with the 
over-representation of Māori in New Zealand prisons. The Court of Appeal, in failing to 
pay attention to the New Zealand jurisprudence, ignored a crucial sentencing provision for 
Māori offenders. Wells provided the Court of Appeal with precedent. In neglecting to look 
at the legislative history, the Court failed to apply s 27 as Parliament intended. Without 
looking to the appropriate provisions enabling a court to consider the issues Mika raised, 
including the systemic and background factors contributing to offending, the court 
dismissed Mika’s appeal in a concise 16-paragraph judgment. Harris observed:66 
 
This was not an easy case for the Court of Appeal to deal with. The issues are 
controversial, and were likely to attract attention regardless of the Court’s conclusion… 
the Court’s judgment is ultimately unpersuasive and does not engage in sufficient depth 
with the complex and weighty issues at play. 
 
Following their acceptance of the problem of over-representation of Māori in New Zealand 
prisons, the Court of Appeal should have exercised their discretion under s 27(5) to suggest 
Mika call on someone to speak on his cultural background, rather than pursue the 10 per 
cent discount.  
 
Mika’s case was not well argued by counsel; both the Judges and counsel were aware of s 
27, yet no use was made of it. Essentially, the burden falls to the judiciary to seek the 
cultural information under s 27(5). After determining the impact of Mr Mika’s cultural 
background and other factors, the sentence arrived at may have been the same. However, 
this does not detract from the fact that the Court failed in its duty to take account of 
Parliament’s intention and to ensure it had relevant cultural material before it. Harris 
  
66 Harris, above n 40, at 22-23. 
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suggests Mika is an example of the New Zealand judiciary lacking boldness and avoiding 
tackling issues of indigenous over-representation in prisons.67 The Court was facing an 
unpopular decision, if they were to factor into the sentencing equation the cultural 
background of the offender, as Parliament intended, the public may have viewed it as 
preferentialism. Ultimately, the decision lacked boldness and, left a gap where analysis of 
Parliament’s intent and the statutory context should have taken place. 
 
B Factors to Consider in Exercise of Discretion 
1 Underutilisation of section 27 
Research indicates s 27 is used infrequently. Judge O’Driscoll described s 27 as one of the 
most underutilised and unknown provisions in the Sentencing Act.68 Halls Sentencing 
recognised s 27 is widely unknown, but when in play the provision could enhance both the 
content and process of sentencing delivering positive sentencing effects in the cases where 
it is present.69 However, it continues to be underutilised and overlooked as a key provision, 
as evidenced by the case of R v Mika.  
 
Section 16 was similarly underutilised. A Ministry of Justice survey conducted in 
1999/2000, aimed to examine the uses and perceptions of s 16 and identify possible 
improvements to the provision or its implementation.70 The survey was sent to 707 
participants, including judges, lawyers, Community Probation Service staff and 
community organisations, with a response rate of 61 per cent.71 The survey identified a 
significant fraction of those working within the criminal justice system, had never 
encountered s 16.72 The survey revealed 44 per cent of lawyers and 14 per cent of judges 
(these numbers are assumed to be greater than the survey indicated due to a lack of 
  
67 Harris, above n 40, at 24. 
68 Judge O’Driscoll “A powerful mitigating tool” (2012) 11 NZLJ 358 at 358. 
69 Geoffrey Hall (ed) Hall’s Sentencing (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [SA27.1]. 
70 Alison Chetwin, Tony Waldegrave, Kiri Simonsen with Strategic Training and Development Services & 
The Family Centre Social Policy Research, above n 52, at iii. 
71 At 115. 
72 At 138. 
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participation by those who have not encountered s 16) had not been involved with s 16.73 
The section’s underutilisation was attributed to the general lack of awareness of its 
availability and use.74 Another significant section of respondents believed there was 
defiance among those working in the court system to make or receive s 16 submissions.75 
Overall, only 14 per cent of respondents thought the provision was used as frequently as it 
could be.76 These results indicate a large portion of cases are not utilising s 27 to its full 
potential. 
 
The survey indicated Māori offenders’ utilised s 16 most commonly, followed by Pacific 
Peoples.77 The people most likely to speak to the court were members of the whānau, while 
community groups and kaumātua were common spokespeople also.78 In 45 per cent of the 
cases reported in the survey, the likely sentence was imprisonment.79 However, in one-
third of those cases the imprisonment was suspended and for a quarter of the cases a 
community-based sentence was imposed.80 This indicates s 16 had a positive impact on the 
sentences imposed when utilised.  
 
In response to the underutilisation, more than half of the survey respondents thought judges 
should promote s 16.81 The role of the judge was interpreted as taking a proactive stance, 
this would involve the judge making the appropriate enquiries at the sentencing stage to 
ascertain whether matters should be brought to the attention of the court.82 One judge as a 
matter of course enquired whether there was anyone present who wished to speak on behalf 
of the offender.83 It was possible for a judge to anticipate s 16 at the point where the case 
  
73 At 138. 
74 At 138. 
75 At 138. 
76 At 138. 
77 At 137. 
78 At 137. 
79 At 137. 
80 At 137. 
81 At 147. 
82 At 147. 
83 At 147. 
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was remanded for a s 23 pre-sentence report.84 Notably, the aim of s 16, to encourage 
alternative sentences to imprisonment, particularly in the case of Māori, has largely been 
unrealised. The report likely had an impact on the expansion of the subsequent s 27. 
 
2 The judiciary’s acknowledgment of the importance of a section 27 request 
 
The New Zealand judiciary is aware of the importance of s 27 when requested, evidenced 
by R v Bhaskaran.85 Bhaskaran appealed against his sentence of three years and three 
months imprisonment, claiming representatives of the Whakatōhea Māori Trust Board 
were not allowed to speak on his behalf at court before the sentence was decided in 
accordance with s 27.86 Counsel for the defendant informed the Judge of the presence of 
representatives to speak on the matters envisaged by s 27 and its reference to personal, 
family, whānau, community, and cultural background of the offender.87 The Judge refused 
to hear from the Whakatōhea Māori Trust Board, without any reasons given under s 27(4), 
and no special reasons were apparent.88 
 
The Court of Appeal was “troubled” by the Judge’s decision not to hear a person speak on 
behalf of the offender.89 The Court recognised community support and encouragement for 
rehabilitation may be relevant to the nature or length of the sentence.90 The support systems 
offered by family, whānau and the community to assist rehabilitation may be important 
factors in mitigating a sentence influenced by considerations of personal deterrence and 
rehabilitation.91 The Court declared a court “must be astute to recognise the valuable 
assistance it may obtain from another cultural, ethnic or other community insight, including 
  
84 At 147. 
85 R v Bhaskaran [2003] BCL 89 (CA). 
86 At [10]. 
87 At [7]. 
88 At [15]. 
89 At [13]. 
90 At [13]. 
91 At [13]. 
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on matters of penal concern.”92 The appellant’s sentence was reduced by three months for 
the trial Judge’s failure to adhere to s 27.93 The Court of Appeal in Bhaskaran placed high 
importance on the offender’s s 27 request. Mika is different because the offender did not 
seek to utilise s 27. Nevertheless, s 27 remains important as the judiciary have discretion 
to suggest the provision be put to use. The judiciary should exercise this duty where 
Parliament envisioned, to protect from injustices. 
 
 
V Other Factors Indicating the Court was Misguided 
A Focus on the Sentencing Discount 
 
The High Court judgment focused on counsel’s argument that Mika’s background and the 
“social deprivation of Māori” entitled him to a 10 per cent discount on his sentence.94 
Gendall J in the High Court acknowledged s 8 of the Sentencing Act allows cultural issues 
to be taken into account, particularly in regard to innovative sentencing.95 But he denies 
the blanket discount on the basis that “Parliament did not say that if you are a member of 
a particular race, culture or ethnic group, this means on its own that you are entitled to a 
sentencing discount.”96 It was open to Mika to place a request for a person to speak under 
s 27 on appeal, but this was not utilised by counsel in either the High Court or the Court of 
Appeal. Gendall J acknowledged “no request was made to the Court under s 27 of the 
Sentencing Act to put before it any specific evidence related to the personal, family, 
whānau, community and cultural background of Mr Mika.”97 
 
While it is a far stretch to envision Parliament intended for a fixed sentencing discount to 
apply to members of a particular race, culture or ethnic group, the judiciary had the tools 
  
92 At [13]. 
93 At [18]. 
94 R v Mika, above n 2, at [59]. 
95 At [67]. 
96 At [67]. 
97 At [66]. 
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to acknowledge and attempt to remedy the over-representation. Section 27 was an 
important provision in this case, and while it remains a presumptive entitlement, the option 
to apply it was available to the Court under s 27(5). The Judiciary had the opportunity to 
acknowledge the over-representation of Māori and subsequently address the issue by 
offering further guidance after Wells v Police for how the Sentencing Act, s 27 could be 
utilised for Māori offenders. The focus on the sentencing discount by both courts meant 
the judiciary failed to investigate whether Parliament had provided guidance on the issue 
of Māori over-representation and whether s 27 and s 8 could be of use. Counsel and the 
judiciary’s failure to utilise s 27 may point to a lack of willingness to apply the sentencing 
provision as intended. 
 
B Insufficient Work Done on how to Reflect Section 27 in Sentencing Options 
 
The discount argument scared the Court of Appeal in Mika. There were many provisions 
available to the Court to take into account this material without introducing a discount. 
Section 27 did not need to be ignored because Mika argued for a discount. Section 27 may 
prove useful when deciding between a custodial sentence and non-custodial, or between 
custodial sentences of different lengths. No assistance is currently available to judges in 
incorporating considerations of Māori offenders’ backgrounds and historic disadvantage. 
The lack of boldness shown by the judiciary could be attributed to confusion regarding the 
practical application of s 27 in sentencing. However, there is no excuse for the judiciary 
not to exercise justice, simply because this work has not yet been done. 
 
C Failure to Take into Account Overseas Jurisdictions 
 
New Zealand’s judiciary can learn from the Canadian courts’ willingness to consider 
cultural factors influencing offending and sentencing. Should the New Zealand judiciary 
decide to utilise s 27 for its purpose, the Canadian jurisprudence provides valuable insight 
into the section’s practical application. 
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Canada has a similar problem of over-representation of indigenous peoples to New 
Zealand, with the number of Aboriginal adults in sentenced custody disproportionately 
high.98 In 2010/2011 the number of Aboriginal people in custody, both territorial and 
federal, was about seven to eight times higher than the proportion of Aboriginal people in 
the general adult population.99 The issue became one of great importance; this is reflected 
in the Canadian Supreme Court decision R v Gladue,100 considered by some to be the most 
significant development in the criminal law for Aboriginal people in the past 25 years.101 
The Supreme Court acknowledged their role in the process of convicting and sentencing 
Aboriginal offenders. Subsequently, the Canadian Criminal Code102 s 718.2(e) was 
interpreted so as to address the problem of over-representation of Aboriginal offenders in 
prison. The Court of Appeal decision in Mika appears to be out of step with not only its 
own jurisprudence, but similarly Canadian jurisprudence.  
 
The Canadian Criminal Code set out an innovative sentencing principle in section 
718.2(e):103  
 
718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following 
principles: 
... 
(e) all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the 
circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the 
circumstances of aboriginal offenders. 
 
This directive was adopted due to the increasing over-representation of Aboriginal people 
in Canadian prisons. This unique section is the only one among common law countries 
  
98 Mia Dauvergne “Adult correctional statistics in Canada, 2010/2011” (2012) Statistics Canada 
<http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2012001/article/11715-eng.htm#a7> at 11. 
99 Dauvergne, above n 98, at 11. 
100 R v Gladue [1999] 1 SCR 688 (SCC). 
101 Jonathan Rudin “Aboriginal Over-representation and R. v. Gladue: Where We Were, Where We Are and 
Where We Might Be Going” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. 687 at 687. 
102 Criminal Code RSC 1985, c C-46. 
103 Criminal Code RSC 1985, c C-46, s 718.2(e) (emphasis added). 
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directing judges to consider specifically the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.104 Alan 
Rock, Justice Minister at the time, explained the section aimed to encourage the courts to 
look to alternatives to imprisonment, where it is consistent with the public safety, and not 
simply to resort to the easy option.105 The legislature issued clear instructions to the 
Judiciary emphasising the importance of ensuring the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders 
is appropriate in the circumstances.  
 
The Supreme Court tested the section parameters in the 1999 case of R v Gladue. Gladue 
was concerned with the interpretation of s 718.2(e). The case concerned Jamie Tanis 
Gladue, an Aboriginal woman, who pled guilty to manslaughter for the killing of her 
husband and was sentenced to three years imprisonment.106 The Supreme Court, in a 
unanimous decision, engaged in a discussion of the purposes and reasons behind s 718.2(e), 
additionally critiquing the high rate of incarceration in Canada generally. The judgment, 
delivered by Cory and Iacobucci JJ, made important observations regarding the nature of 
Aboriginal over-representation in Canada:107 
 
The figures are stark and reflect what may fairly be termed a crisis in the Canadian 
criminal justice system. The drastic over-representation of aboriginal peoples within 
both the Canadian prison population and the criminal justice system reveals a sad and 
pressing social problem. It is reasonable to assume that Parliament, in singling out 
aboriginal offenders for distinct sentencing treatment in s. 718.2(e), intended to attempt 
to redress this social problem to some degree. The provision may properly be seen as 
Parliament’s direction to members of the judiciary to inquire into the causes of the 
problem and to endeavour to remedy it, to the extent that a remedy is possible through 
the sentencing process. 
 
Gladue was a moment of clarity for the Canadian Supreme Court. The judiciary 
acknowledged and took responsibility for their role in the over-representation crisis. The 
  
104 Rudin, above n 101, at 689-690. 
105 Rudin, above n 101, at 690. 
106 At 688. 
107 At [64]. 
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Court recognised many factors contribute to the over-representation of Aboriginal 
offenders including poverty, substance abuse, and lack of education and employment 
opportunities.108 As the decision-makers with the power to determine directly whether an 
Aboriginal offender will be incarcerated or whether another sentencing option will be 
employed, the Canadian Supreme Court acknowledged the important role the judiciary 
play.109 The Court emphasised the legislature’s intention and the pressing need for judicial 
action.110 Ultimately, the Court interpreted Parliament’s signals to mean cultural factors 
ought not to be ignored and underutilised. The Court of Appeal in Mika had the opportunity 
to consider Parliament’s intent and the earlier decision of Wells in deciding whether to 
utilise their s 27(5) discretion, yet declined to do so.  
 
The Supreme Court offered guidance for sentencing an Aboriginal offender in line with 
section 718.2(e). The judiciary focused on the distinct situation of Aboriginal peoples in 
Canada, encompassing a wide range of circumstances, including, most particularly:111 
 
(A) The unique systemic or background factors which may have played a part in bringing 
the particular aboriginal offender before the courts; and 
(B) The types of sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the 
circumstances for the offender because of his or her particular aboriginal heritage or 
connection. 
 
Gladue declared s 718.2(e) reports compulsory when sentencing an Aboriginal offender; 
in all cases judicial notice must be taken of the systemic or background factors and 
alternative sentencing options.112 The Court expected counsel would help the judge prepare 
the relevant background evidence for cultural considerations at sentencing.113 Aboriginal 
  
108 At [65]. 
109 At [65]. 
110 At [64].  
111 At [66]. 
112 At [83]. 
113 At [83]. 
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offenders retain the ability to waive the right to have attention paid to their particular 
circumstances.114  
 
The provision is not a ‘free pass’ for a lighter sentence, the Aboriginal offenders must show 
unique systemic background factors may have contributed to the offending, as well as 
alternative sanctions that may be appropriate in the circumstances. A blanket discount is 
not applied to their sentence by virtue solely of being Aboriginal.115 In order to adduce the 
appropriate sentence to fit the offender, the judge must have information on the offender, 
their background and the systemic factors that have played a role in their life. Justice 
Knazan at the Ontario Conference of Judges and the Canadian Association of Provincial 
Court Judges annual conference in 2000 announced almost two years after R v Gladue 
confusion remained over the application of the section.116 The problems were basic, 
including the difficulty for judges in knowing when an Aboriginal offender was before the 
court.117 The conference concerned the creation of a specialised Gladue court dealing with 
the sentencing of Aboriginal people. The Gladue Court began hearing cases in 2001, and 
expanded to create two other Gladue Courts dealing only with bail hearings and sentencing 
Aboriginal offenders.118  
 
The role of the Gladue Caseworker, involved preparing written reports on Aboriginal 
offenders at the request of the judge, defence or Crown to support the Gladue Courts.119 
These reports, requested by a judge under s 718.2(e), detail extensively the offender’s life 
circumstances, including interviews with friends, family members and people who may be 
able to provide insight into the offender’s life.120 Further, the reports illustrate the systemic 
factors that have affected Aboriginal people and put forward solid plans for alternative 
  
114 At [83]. 
115 Rudin, above n 101, at 703. 
116 Rudin, above n 101, at 704-705. 
117 Rudin, above n 101, at 705. 
118 Rudin, above n 101, at 705. 
119 Rudin, above n 101, at 705. 
120 Rudin, above n 101, at 705. 
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sentences to imprisonment.121 Research suggests the Gladue reports have seen a positive 
impact on the sentences handed down to Aboriginal offenders.122 
 
In 2013, the Legal Services Society (LSS) of Canada, evaluated the results of the Gladue 
Report Pilot Project where trained writers prepare Gladue reports for Aboriginal 
offenders.123 The programme aimed to provide Aboriginal people with comprehensive 
Gladue reports when facing sentencing or bail hearings.124 LSS compared case outcomes 
for 42 clients with a Gladue report and matched this with similar cases where the 
Aboriginal client did not utilise the Gladue report.125 Fewer Gladue clients received a 
sentence of incarceration for the same offence.126 Further, when comparing a client’s 
previous sentence with their current sentence for the same offence (utilising a Gladue 
report), the results indicated Gladue reports decrease the severity of the sentence.127 When 
an offender commits the same offence, it is expected their sentence will increase or remain 
the same. However, the Gladue results indicate 76 per cent of clients received a shorter 
sentence the second time they committed the same offence.128 The LSS results suggest 
Gladue reports may make an impact on the number of Aboriginal offenders in Canadian 
prisons. 
 
New Zealand can learn from the Canadian approach to 718.2(e). Practical issues will arise 
in applying a section like this and Canada’s approach has not been without difficulty. To 
make the best use of s 27 of the Sentencing Act, the New Zealand judiciary would need to 
accept Parliament’s intention for the provision to apply to Māori offenders appearing for 
sentencing. In line with the intention of the legislature, judges should proactively seek 
  
121 Rudin, above n 101, at 705. 
122 Legal Services Society “Evaluation of Gladue Report Pilot Project” (June 2013) Legal Services Society: 
Aboriginal Services 
<http://www.legalaid.bc.ca/assets/aboutUs/reports/aboriginalServices/gladueReportDisbursementEvaluatio
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123 Legal Services Society, above n 122, at i. 
124 At 5. 
125 At 21. 
126 At 22. 
127 At 24-25. 
128 At 24-25. 
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information under s 27 and indicate cultural factors will be considered under the section. 
Encouragement of use of the provision will inevitably increase awareness of the section. 
In practice, counsel will likely be responsible for preparing the s 27 requests and the 
particular people to speak on the background of the offender in court. Section 27 has the 
potential to be a common sentencing practice in mainstream criminal courts, should the 
judiciary utilise it for the purpose for which it was created. 
 
 
VI Conclusion 
 
This paper demonstrates the flaws in the Court of Appeal’s decision in Mika. The causes 
of over-representation are numerous, and no one fix exists. However, where a practical 
solution has been established by the legislature, it is the role of the judiciary not to shirk 
their responsibilities when they prove difficult. The Court of Appeal did not engage with 
the provision and New Zealand’s jurisprudence to the extent necessary in the case, perhaps 
for fear of the ‘ethnicity’ factor in sentencing. The judiciary’s failure to acknowledge 
Parliament intended s 27 to apply to Māori offenders especially is disappointing 
considering the major role they play in sentencing. The judiciary should encourage the use 
of s 27, especially where a Māori offender is arguing cultural factors should be considered 
in determining a sentence. This would be consistent with the section’s purpose and may 
work to reduce the disproportionate numbers of Māori in New Zealand prisons. Justice 
Joseph Williams’ 2013 Harkness Henry Lecture discusses the use of s 27 in the Matariki 
Court; a ‘s 27 Court’ that focuses on receiving information about cultural and family 
background to inform the sentencing process; this is a development to watch in future.129 
 
The Court in Mika v R dismiss Mika’s argument for the court to consider his Māori heritage 
and associated disadvantages, without any real discussion of Parliament’s attempts to 
reduce the over-representation of Māori in the criminal justice system. If the issue were to 
come before a New Zealand appellate court again, the judiciary should take an initiative 
  
129 Justice Joseph Williams “Lex Aotearoa: An Heroic Attempt to Map the Māori Dimension in Modern New 
Zealand Law” (2013) 21 WLR 1 at 27. 
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similar to Smellie J in Wells and look to Parliament’s intent. It would not constitute judicial 
overreach to interpret the provision with special consideration for Māori, as feared by the 
Court in Mika. Further, New Zealand could learn from the steps taken in R v Gladue, 
providing an important indication of the practical issues to be addressed in applying the 
section. The Canadian jurisprudence provides valuable insight and lessons into the process 
taken to apply a section similar to New Zealand’s s 27, in an effort to reduce 
disproportionate numbers in prison.  
 
The failure by the Court of Appeal in Mika v R is concerning, the sections were glossed 
over without any real application to Mika’s cultural background and the systemic 
disadvantages he may have suffered. The New Zealand judiciary have further work to do 
in this area to remedy this. 
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VII Appendices 
A Sentencing Act 2002 provisions 
1 Section 8 
 
8 Principles of sentencing or otherwise dealing with offenders 
In sentencing or otherwise dealing with an offender the court— 
(a) must take into account the gravity of the offending in the particular case, including 
the degree of culpability of the offender; and 
(b) must take into account the seriousness of the type of offence in comparison with 
other types of offences, as indicated by the maximum penalties prescribed for the 
offences; and 
(c) must impose the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence if the offending is 
within the most serious of cases for which that penalty is prescribed, unless 
circumstances relating to the offender make that inappropriate; and 
(d) must impose a penalty near to the maximum prescribed for the offence if the 
offending is near to the most serious of cases for which that penalty is prescribed, 
unless circumstances relating to the offender make that inappropriate; and 
(e) must take into account the general desirability of consistency with appropriate 
sentencing levels and other means of dealing with offenders in respect of similar 
offenders committing similar offences in similar circumstances; and 
(f) must take into account any information provided to the court concerning the effect 
of the offending on the victim; and 
(g) must impose the least restrictive outcome that is appropriate in the circumstances, 
in accordance with the hierarchy of sentences and orders set out in section 10A; and 
(h) must take into account any particular circumstances of the offender that mean that 
a sentence or other means of dealing with the offender that would otherwise be 
appropriate would, in the particular instance, be disproportionately severe; and 
(i) must take into account the offender's personal, family, whanau, community, and 
cultural background in imposing a sentence or other means of dealing with the 
offender with a partly or wholly rehabilitative purpose; and 
(j) must take into account any outcomes of restorative justice processes that have 
occurred, or that the court is satisfied are likely to occur, in relation to the particular 
case (including, without limitation, anything referred to in section 10). 
 
2 Section 25 
 
25 Power of adjournment for inquiries as to suitable punishment 
(1) A court may adjourn the proceedings in respect of any offence after the offender 
has been found guilty or has pleaded guilty and before the offender has been 
sentenced or otherwise dealt with for any 1 or more of the following purposes: 
(a) to enable inquiries to be made or to determine the most suitable method of 
dealing with the case: 
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(b) to enable a restorative justice process to occur: 
(c) to enable a restorative justice agreement to be fulfilled: 
(d) to enable a rehabilitation programme or course of action to be undertaken: 
(da) to determine whether to impose an instrument forfeiture order and, if so, the 
terms of that order: 
(e) to enable the court to take account of the offender's response to any process, 
agreement, programme, or course of action referred to in paragraph (b), (c), 
or (d). 
 
3 Section 26 
26 Pre-sentence reports 
(1) Except as provided in section 26A, if an offender who is charged with an 
offence punishable by imprisonment is found guilty or pleads guilty, the court 
may direct a probation officer to prepare a report for the court in accordance 
with subsection (2). 
(2) A pre-sentence report may include— 
(a) information regarding the personal, family, whānau, community, and 
cultural background, and social circumstances of the offender: 
(b) information regarding the factors contributing to the offence, and the 
rehabilitative needs of the offender: 
(c) information regarding any offer, agreement, response, or measure of a 
kind referred to in section 10(1) or the outcome of any other restorative 
justice processes that have occurred in relation to the case: 
(d) recommendations on the appropriate sentence or other disposition of 
the case, taking into account the risk of further offending by the 
offender: 
(e) in the case of a proposed sentence of supervision, intensive 
supervision, or home detention, recommendations on the appropriate 
conditions of that sentence: 
(f) in the case of a proposed sentence of supervision, intensive 
supervision, or home detention involving 1 or more programmes,— 
(i) a report on the programme or programmes, including a general 
description of the conditions that the offender will have to abide 
by; and 
(ii) confirmation that the report has been made available to the 
offender: 
(g) in the case of a proposed sentence of supervision, intensive 
supervision, or home detention involving a special condition requiring 
the offender to take prescription medication, confirmation that the 
offender— 
(i) has been fully advised by a person who is qualified to prescribe 
that medication about the nature and likely or intended effect of 
the medication and any known risks; and 
(ii) consents to taking the prescription medication: 
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(h) in the case of a proposed sentence of community work,— 
(i) information regarding the availability of community work of a 
kind referred to in section 63 in the area in which the offender 
will reside; and 
(ii) recommendations on whether the court should authorise, under 
section 66A, hours of work to be spent undertaking training in 
basic work and living skills. 
(3) The court must not direct the preparation of a report under subsection (1) on 
any aspects of the personal characteristics or personal history of an offender if 
a report covering those aspects is readily available to the court and there is no 
reason to believe that there has been any change of significance to the court 
since the report was prepared. 
(4) On directing the preparation of a report under subsection (1), the court may 
indicate to the probation officer the type of sentence or other mode of 
disposition that the court is considering, and may also give any other guidance 
to the probation officer that will assist the officer to prepare the report. 
(5) If a court has directed the preparation of a report under subsection (1), the 
probation officer charged with the preparation of the report may seek the 
further directions of the court on— 
(a) any particular item of information sought by the court; or 
(b) any alternative sentence or other mode of disposition that may be 
considered by the court if it appears that the sentence or other mode of 
disposition under consideration is inappropriate 
 
4 Section 27 
 
27 Offender may request court to hear person on personal, family, whanau, 
community, and cultural background of offender 
(1) If an offender appears before a court for sentencing, the offender may request 
the court to hear any person or persons called by the offender to speak on— 
(a) the personal, family, whanau, community, and cultural background of 
the offender: 
(b) the way in which that background may have related to the commission 
of the offence: 
(c) any processes that have been tried to resolve, or that are available to 
resolve, issues relating to the offence, involving the offender and his or 
her family, whanau, or community and the victim or victims of the 
offence: 
(d) how support from the family, whanau, or community may be available 
to help prevent further offending by the offender: 
(e) how the offender's background, or family, whanau, or community 
support may be relevant in respect of possible sentences. 
(2) The court must hear a person or persons called by the offender under this 
section on any of the matters specified in subsection (1) unless the court is 
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satisfied that there is some special reason that makes this unnecessary or 
inappropriate. 
(3) If the court declines to hear a person called by the offender under this section, 
the court must give reasons for doing so. 
(4) Without limiting any other powers of a court to adjourn, the court may adjourn 
the proceedings to enable arrangements to be made to hear a person or persons 
under this section. 
(5) If an offender does not make a request under this section, the court may suggest 
to the offender that it may be of assistance to the court to hear a person or 
persons called by the offender on any of the matters specified in subsection 
(1). 
 
 
B Criminal Justice Act 1985 provisions 
1 Section 16  
 
S 16 Offender may call witness as to cultural and family background — 
(1) Where any offender appears before any court for sentence, the offender may request 
the court to hear any person called by the offender to speak to any of the matters 
specified in subsection (2) of this section; and the court shall hear that person unless 
it is satisfied that, because the penalty that may be imposed is fixed by law of for 
any other special reason, it would not be of assistance to hear that person. 
(2) The matters to which a person may be called to speak under subsection (1) of this 
section are, broadly, the ethnic or cultural background of the offender, the way in 
which that background may relate to the commission of the offence, and the positive 
effects that background may have in helping to avoid further offending. 
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